The History of Taxes

Gabrielle Birchak/ April 8, 2026/ Ancient History, Classical Antiquity, Contemporary History, Middle Ages, Modern History, Post Classical/ 0 comments

By stevepb — https://pixabay.com/photos/income-tax-calculation-calculate-491626/, CC0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=79003441

It is rough­ly 2300 BCE in the city of Lagash, in what we now call south­ern Iraq. The riv­er is brown and wide. Bar­ley is stacked in tall, sun-dried bun­dles out­side the tem­ple. A scribe crouch­es over a clay tablet, press­ing a reed into wet clay with prac­ticed, delib­er­ate strokes.

He is not writ­ing a poem. He is not record­ing a mar­riage. He is writ­ing down what you owe.

The tem­ple needs grain to feed its work­ers. The city needs labor to main­tain its irri­ga­tion canals. The king needs sil­ver to pay his sol­diers (and him­self). And you, the farmer, the mer­chant, the fish­er­man, are expect­ed to con­tribute your share of all of it.

This is where the sto­ry of tax­es begins. Not in a cham­ber of elect­ed rep­re­sen­ta­tives. Not with a dec­la­ra­tion or a con­sti­tu­tion. It begins here, in the riv­er mud, with a reed pressed into clay.

And it rais­es the ques­tion that echoes through every civ­i­liza­tion that has come after:

Who decides what you owe, and what does it cost to belong to a society?

The First Collectors

The ear­li­est known records of tax­a­tion come from ancient Mesopotamia, from the Sumer­ian city-states that flour­ished between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Archae­o­log­i­cal evi­dence from around 3000 BCE indi­cates that grain and live­stock were col­lect­ed by tem­ple admin­is­tra­tors, who served as both reli­gious and civic authorities.

This mat­ters because it tells us some­thing about how tax­es were orig­i­nal­ly under­stood. They were not strict­ly a gov­ern­ment func­tion. They were a form of par­tic­i­pa­tion in the col­lec­tive order of things, part oblig­a­tion, part rit­u­al, part sur­vival. The tem­ple stored grain, and the grain kept peo­ple alive when the har­vest failed.

In Egypt, things were even more orga­nized, and in fact, accord­ing to Smith­son­ian Mag­a­zine, it is the Egyp­tians who deserve the most cred­it, or the most blame, for invent­ing the sys­tem we are all still liv­ing with. The world’s ear­li­est known sys­tem of tax­a­tion emerged in Egypt at the dawn of civ­i­liza­tion itself, around 3000 BCE, when the First Dynasty uni­fied Upper and Low­er Egypt. For most of its his­to­ry, ancient Egypt levied tax­es on goods: grain, tex­tiles, labor, and cat­tle, with a fixed per­cent­age of each har­vest ear­marked for state granaries.

To ensure that provin­cial gov­er­nors accu­rate­ly report­ed their dis­tricts’ wealth, Old King­dom pharaohs con­duct­ed annu­al or bian­nu­al tours of the king­dom to assess it in per­son. And in a detail that will feel grim­ly famil­iar, the Egyp­tians also pio­neered the con­cepts of tax fraud, eva­sion, and cor­rup­tion; scribes and gov­er­nors would often coop­er­ate to under­re­port num­bers and pock­et the sur­plus, while tax­pay­ers manip­u­lat­ed weight­ed scales used to mea­sure grain. As Egyp­tol­o­gist Toby Wilkin­son of Cam­bridge told Smith­son­ian, the fun­da­men­tal basis of human soci­ety has not changed in 5,000 years.

The log­ic seems rec­og­niz­able. Some­one needs to build some­thing. Some­one needs to feed an army. Some­one needs to repair the dam before the riv­er floods the fields. And so many need­ed to give up some por­tion of what they have. That log­ic has nev­er real­ly changed. What changes in every civ­i­liza­tion is who gets to define what that por­tion is.

Athens, Rome, and the Politics of Obligation

By the time we reach ancient Greece in the fifth cen­tu­ry BCE, tax­es had become deeply polit­i­cal, which is to say, deeply contested.

In Athens, wealthy cit­i­zens were expect­ed to fund pub­lic projects through a sys­tem called the litur­gy, a kind of civic oblig­a­tion that required wealthy Athe­ni­ans to per­son­al­ly finance war­ships, the­atri­cal fes­ti­vals, and pub­lic cer­e­monies. This was not quite a tax in the mod­ern sense. It was more like a com­pul­so­ry dona­tion with social pres­tige attached. You were expect­ed to give gen­er­ous­ly, and if you were seen as stingy, you risked your rep­u­ta­tion in a city where rep­u­ta­tion was everything.

Reg­u­lar cit­i­zens, mean­while, paid very lit­tle in direct tax­a­tion. The Athe­ni­ans actu­al­ly con­sid­ered direct tax­a­tion on cit­i­zens to be a sign of tyran­ny, some­thing imposed by despots, not democ­ra­cies. They were not wrong. Rev­enue came instead from sil­ver mines, trade tolls, and trib­ute from sub­ject states. When Athens need­ed emer­gency funds dur­ing wartime, it imposed a spe­cial tax called the eis­pho­ra on wealth­i­er res­i­dents, but this was under­stood as a tem­po­rary, excep­tion­al measure.

Rome tells a dif­fer­ent sto­ry. The Roman Repub­lic ini­tial­ly oper­at­ed sim­i­lar­ly: direct tax­a­tion of cit­i­zens was con­sid­ered shame­ful and reserved for emer­gen­cies. Rev­enue came from con­quered ter­ri­to­ries, trib­ute, and cus­toms duties. But as the empire expand­ed, so did its admin­is­tra­tive needs.

By the time of Augus­tus, Rome had devel­oped one of the most sophis­ti­cat­ed tax col­lec­tion sys­tems in the ancient world. The trib­u­tum soli taxed land. The trib­u­tum capi­tis taxed indi­vid­u­als. Cus­toms duties were levied at ports and provin­cial bor­ders. And for a time, the whole machine ran on the labor of tax farm­ers, pri­vate con­trac­tors called pub­li­cani who paid the gov­ern­ment upfront for the right to col­lect tax­es in a province. Once that deal was struck, the pub­li­cani were on their own: they had already paid Rome, so every addi­tion­al coin they extract­ed from the local pop­u­la­tion was pure prof­it for them­selves. The hard­er they squeezed, the more they kept.

The Medieval Bargain

With the fall of Rome, cen­tral­ized tax­a­tion large­ly col­lapsed in West­ern Europe. What replaced it was feu­dal­ism, a sys­tem in which oblig­a­tion was per­son­al and local rather than insti­tu­tion­al and imperial.

You owed labor to your lord. Your lord owed mil­i­tary ser­vice to a king. The king, in the­o­ry, owed pro­tec­tion to every­one below him. Tax­es were not col­lect­ed by a bureau­cra­cy; they were demand­ed by who­ev­er had the sword and the land. The anar­cho-syn­di­cal­ist com­mune, where deci­sions are rat­i­fied by a two-thirds major­i­ty at a spe­cial biweek­ly meet­ing, was not yet tak­ing appoint­ments. As Den­nis from Mon­ty Python’s Holy Grail would lat­er observe, strange women lying in ponds dis­trib­ut­ing swords is no basis for a sys­tem of gov­ern­ment. But in medieval Europe, it was close enough.

But even in this frag­ment­ed sys­tem, cer­tain pat­terns per­sist­ed. The church­es col­lect­ed a tithe, which was one-tenth of every household’s income or pro­duce. It was pro­posed as a prin­ci­ple of reci­procity, where­in the one who gives the most receives the most bless­ings. And it was enforced not by sol­diers but by the threat of spir­i­tu­al con­se­quences. It was, and is, in a way, one of the most effec­tive tax­a­tion sys­tems ever devised, because the col­lec­tor doesn’t need an army. The fear of hell does the work.

In Eng­land, the sto­ry gets inter­est­ing in 1215. King John of Eng­land had been drain­ing his barons dry, tax­ing feu­dal oblig­a­tions beyond what cus­tom allowed, demand­ing mon­ey for mil­i­tary cam­paigns that kept fail­ing, and gen­er­al­ly behav­ing as though roy­al author­i­ty had no lim­its. Sounds famil­iar. The barons had had enough. They forced him to sign the Magna Car­ta, which con­tained a prin­ci­ple that would echo through cen­turies of polit­i­cal his­to­ry: the king could not levy cer­tain tax­es with­out the con­sent of the realm.

That sin­gle idea, no tax­a­tion with­out con­sent, would trav­el from the fields of Run­nymede to the floors of Par­lia­ment to the pam­phlets of Amer­i­can rev­o­lu­tion­ary colonists, each gen­er­a­tion restat­ing it with a new and right­ful urgency.

The Birth of the Income Tax

For most of his­to­ry, gov­ern­ments taxed things you owned or trad­ed: land, live­stock, goods mov­ing across a bor­der, and win­dows in your house. The idea of tax­ing what you earn, your income, as a per­cent­age, is sur­pris­ing­ly modern.

The income tax, as we rec­og­nize it, was born in Britain in 1799, cre­at­ed by Prime Min­is­ter William Pitt the Younger as an emer­gency mea­sure to fund the wars against Napoleon. It was sup­posed to be tem­po­rary. It was struc­tured in tiers, with high­er rates for high­er incomes, and it was deeply unpop­u­lar. Pitt set the rate at two shillings in the pound, rough­ly 10%, for incomes above £200 per year.

The tax was repealed after the Napoleon­ic Wars end­ed, as promised. But gov­ern­ments have a way of redis­cov­er­ing nefar­i­ous and dra­con­ian tools. Britain rein­stat­ed the income tax in 1842 under Robert Peel, this time to cov­er a gen­er­al bud­get short­fall rather than a war emer­gency, and it has nev­er gone away.

In the Unit­ed States, the tra­jec­to­ry was sim­i­lar. The fed­er­al gov­ern­ment tried an income tax dur­ing the Civ­il War, then let it lapse. It tried again in 1894, and the Supreme Court struck it down as uncon­sti­tu­tion­al. Then came the Six­teenth Amend­ment in 1913, which gave Con­gress the explic­it pow­er to levy tax­es on income with­out appor­tion­ing them among the states, and with that, the mod­ern Amer­i­can tax sys­tem was born.

In its first year, the fed­er­al income tax applied only to indi­vid­u­als earn­ing more than $3,000 per year, equiv­a­lent to rough­ly $90,000 today, and the top rate was just 7%. It was, by any mod­ern stan­dard, a tax that touched almost nobody.

World War II changed that entirely.

The Democ­ra­ti­za­tion of the Tax Return

Before the Sec­ond World War, fil­ing an income tax return was some­thing that wealthy peo­ple did. Most Amer­i­cans earned too lit­tle to qual­i­fy. But the war’s enor­mous expense forced the gov­ern­ment to dra­mat­i­cal­ly expand the tax base, low­er­ing the income thresh­old until tens of mil­lions of work­ing Amer­i­cans sud­den­ly found them­selves fil­ing for the first time.

To make col­lec­tion prac­ti­cal at this new scale, the gov­ern­ment intro­duced some­thing that now seems com­plete­ly ordi­nary: with­hold­ing. Instead of ask­ing work­ers to cal­cu­late and pay their annu­al tax in a lump sum, employ­ers would deduct tax­es from each pay­check and send the mon­ey direct­ly to the gov­ern­ment. This sys­tem, intro­duced in 1943, was designed in part by econ­o­mist Mil­ton Fried­man, who lat­er said it was one of the deci­sions in his career he most regretted.

With­hold­ing worked. It made the expand­ed income tax polit­i­cal­ly man­age­able because most peo­ple nev­er saw the mon­ey in the first place. It also per­ma­nent­ly altered the rela­tion­ship between Amer­i­can work­ers and their gov­ern­ment; tax­es became, in a way, invis­i­ble as they had nev­er been before.

The Ques­tion That Persists

Every major tax debate in his­to­ry, from the Athen­ian litur­gy to the Magna Car­ta to the Boston Tea Par­ty to mod­ern argu­ments about cap­i­tal gains and wealth tax­es, keeps com­ing back to the same fun­da­men­tal ques­tion: what is a fair share?

The philosopher’s abil­i­ty to answer that ques­tion has always depend­ed on what you think soci­ety is for. If civ­i­liza­tion is a col­lec­tive project, a shared under­tak­ing that builds roads, edu­cates chil­dren, main­tains courts, and pro­tects bor­ders, tax­a­tion is the price of mem­ber­ship, and a fair price is one cal­i­brat­ed to what each mem­ber can afford to pay.

If, on the oth­er hand, you believe that what you earn is pri­mar­i­ly yours, and that gov­ern­ment intrudes on an individual’s sov­er­eign­ty when it takes a share, then every tax is a nego­ti­a­tion about how much intru­sion is justifiable.

And in the last two hun­dred years, that nego­ti­a­tion has had a very spe­cif­ic bat­tle­ground: the top mar­gin­al rate.

Here is what that means in plain lan­guage. In most mod­ern income tax sys­tems, you don’t pay one flat rate on every­thing you earn. Your income is divid­ed into brack­ets, and each brack­et is taxed at a pro­gres­sive­ly high­er rate. The top mar­gin­al rate is the per­cent­age applied to the high­est brack­et, the slice of income above a cer­tain thresh­old. It does not mean the wealthy pay that rate on every dol­lar they earn. It means that once your income cross­es a cer­tain thresh­old, every dol­lar above that thresh­old is taxed at that spe­cif­ic rate, and every­thing below it is taxed at the same low­er rates every­one else pays.

In the Unit­ed States, that num­ber has swung dra­mat­i­cal­ly over the last cen­tu­ry. It peaked at 94% dur­ing World War II, mean­ing the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment claimed 94 cents of every dol­lar earned above the top thresh­old. It held at 70% through most of the post­war era. Ronald Rea­gan cut it to 50% in 1981, then to 28% by 1986. Today it sits at 37%. Same tax sys­tem, very dif­fer­ent negotiations.

The pat­tern behind those swings is strik­ing. Polit­i­cal sci­en­tists Ken­neth Scheve and David Stasav­age, study­ing two cen­turies of tax data across twen­ty coun­tries, found that the sin­gle most reli­able dri­ver of high top mar­gin­al rates was not left-wing gov­ern­ments, not ris­ing inequal­i­ty, but mass war­fare, specif­i­cal­ly, mil­i­tary con­scrip­tion. When ordi­nary cit­i­zens were being draft­ed and dying in trench­es, the polit­i­cal argu­ment for tax­ing the wealthy at very high rates became almost impos­si­ble to resist. The shared sac­ri­fice of war made the ques­tion of fair­ness impos­si­ble to ignore. And when the wars end­ed, and the mem­o­ry of that shared sac­ri­fice fad­ed, the rates came down. In the 1980s, the Unit­ed States and Britain led a glob­al wave of top-rate reduc­tions. The coun­tries that fol­lowed with­in a decade include Aus­tralia, Cana­da, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Nor­way, and Swe­den, with France and Ger­many mak­ing more grad­ual reduc­tions rather than resist­ing entirely.

The Organ­i­sa­tion for Eco­nom­ic Co-oper­a­tion and Devel­op­ment (the OECD) is an inter­gov­ern­men­tal orga­ni­za­tion that was found­ed in 1961 and includes 38 mem­ber coun­tries that seek to uphold poli­cies for advanc­ing the world-wide econ­o­my. The OECD doc­u­ment­ed that the aver­age top mar­gin­al rate across nine­teen mem­ber coun­tries fell from 67% in 1981 to 49% by 2018, with most of the sharpest cuts con­cen­trat­ed in the late 1980s and ear­ly 1990s.

The most recent chap­ter in that sto­ry is the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed by Pres­i­dent Trump. It low­ered the top mar­gin­al rate from 39.6% to 37%, where it remains today. On the sur­face, that looks like a mod­est adjust­ment. But the indi­vid­ual rate was only part of the law. The cor­po­rate tax rate was cut from 35% to 21%, a much larg­er reduc­tion, and research by econ­o­mists at the Joint Com­mit­tee on Tax­a­tion and the Fed­er­al Reserve found that near­ly all of the ben­e­fits from that cor­po­rate cut flowed to high-income share­hold­ers and exec­u­tives, not to low­er-paid work­ers.

What about low­er-income earn­ers? The indi­vid­ual income tax in the Unit­ed States is on the record as pro­gres­sive; high­er earn­ers pay high­er rates, and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act tech­ni­cal­ly low­ered rates across most brack­ets, includ­ing low­er ones. How­ev­er, the over­all effect of the full law tilt­ed toward the wealthy.

The Brook­ings Insti­tu­tion put it plain­ly: the law made the dis­tri­b­u­tion of after-tax income more unequal. And if it ends up being financed through cuts to pro­grams that low­er-income house­holds depend on, Med­ic­aid, food assis­tance, hous­ing vouch­ers, most of those house­holds will end up worse off than if the law had nev­er passed.

The Cen­ter on Bud­get and Pol­i­cy Pri­or­i­ties not­ed some­thing that stings: the same drafters who agreed to a deep­er cut in the top rate turned down calls to expand the Child Tax Cred­it for eleven mil­lion chil­dren in low-income work­ing fam­i­lies. The Earned Income Tax Cred­it, one of the most effec­tive tools Amer­i­ca has for lift­ing low-wage work­ers, was left entire­ly untouched.

So when you hear debates today about whether the top rate should be high­er or low­er, you are hear­ing an argu­ment that has been run­ning, in one form or anoth­er, since the first per­son with the most was asked to give a larg­er share. The num­bers change. The log­ic under­neath them does not.

Nei­ther of these views is new. The Athe­ni­ans debat­ed them. The Roman Sen­ate debat­ed them. The Eng­lish barons at Run­nymede were hav­ing a ver­sion of this debate in 1215. What is new, in every era, is the par­tic­u­lar form the ques­tion takes, the spe­cif­ic tech­nol­o­gy, the spe­cif­ic inequal­i­ty, the spe­cif­ic emer­gency that forces soci­eties to ask it again.

The scribe in ancient Lagash, press­ing his reed into wet clay, was not the last per­son to make some­one account for what they owed. He was the first in a very long line.

And in the Unit­ed States, that line runs all the way to your mail­box on April 15th.

Fur­ther Reading

UK Par­lia­ment, “Income Tax”: https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/taxation/overview/incometax/

Bri­tan­ni­ca, “Tax­a­tion, His­to­ry of Tax­a­tion”: https://www.britannica.com/topic/taxation/History-of-taxation

U.S. Nation­al Archives, “16th Amend­ment”: https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/16th-amendment

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